Impacts of fertilizer price rises

ANTHONY BUTLER | Rising food prices threaten South Africa’s stability

Supply chain shocks in the Middle East drive up grain and vegetable prices

First published in Business Day

September 17, 2026

Historians and political scientists like to remind us that 18th century bread riots presaged the French Revolution, rising food costs contributed to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and increases in bread prices helped spark the 2011 Arab Spring. While warnings about oil supply risks and price rises have captured the attention of political leaders, the Middle East war also matters because the region is an important producers of urea, ammonia and sulphur, which are essential inputs for commercial agriculture.

After the initial disruption of the Gulf of Hormuz, it was anticipated that fertilizer production costs would rise and exports from Gulf producers would be delayed or diverted. This led to fears of a global food crisis. While gulf exports have indeed fallen dramatically, however, alternative suppliers such as Egypt, Nigeria, Russia, China and the United States have filled the gap so that warehouses have not run empty. But fertiliser prices have been rising to unsustainable levels for many poorer countries.

Governments maintain strategic petroleum reserves that act as a buffer against immediate oil price impacts, although of course these are now running low across the globe. There is no comparable international reserve system for fertiliser. That means fertiliser markets adjust pretty directly, mostly through price, and the burden falls disproportionately on poorer importing countries.

In the short term, some farmers reduce fertilizer application, affecting future crop yields. While not immediately visible, lower yields and higher costs from the last planting season eventually start to reduce food supply. Over longer periods, nutrient deficient soil becomes permanently less productive. As prices for staple grains and vegetables begin to rise for consumers, they act as a regressive tax, hitting poorer households especially hard.

While rising food prices do not have political effects on their own, they can be the spark that ignites broader pre-existing grievances around inequality, corruption, and political repression, and the focal point for wider anger at governments.

South Africa’s exposure is not only direct (through fertiliser and fuel imports), but indirect through the fragility of neighbouring states. As a region, southern Africa is a net importer of both food and fertilizer.

Countries such as Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia were especially dependent on Gulf suppliers before the Hormuz disruption and they have significant smallholder farming. When fertiliser prices rise sharply, many farmers simply reduce application rates rather than paying the higher price. The result is lower maize yields the following season. That matters because South Africa is the region’s principal surplus maize producer. Poor harvests elsewhere increase demand for SA grain, raising domestic food prices and putting pressure on export logistics.

Higher prices will hurt consumers and strain foreign exchange reserves across the region. The urban poor will be especially hard hit by rising food costs, increasing the risks of social unrest in big cities. Opposition movements are likely to place blame on incumbents and tap into discontent.

While it would be an overstatement to say that higher fertiliser prices directly cause migration, moreover, but they can contribute to it. Where livelihoods depend heavily on agriculture, prolonged economic distress can encourage movement towards cities and sometimes across borders. South Africa has historically been the main destination for regional labour migration, so economic shocks elsewhere often have domestic political consequences here.

This provides a useful reminder that SA’s security is increasingly tied to the institutional resilience of southern Africa. Investments in logistics, agricultural trade corridors and regional food security may yield larger political dividends than they first appear, because they reduce the likelihood that external geopolitical shocks become domestic governance crises. The maintenance of strong political relationships with regional partners, moreover, has become more important than ever.

Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town

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