Impacts of fertilizer price rises

ANTHONY BUTLER | Rising food prices threaten South Africa’s stability

Supply chain shocks in the Middle East drive up grain and vegetable prices

First published in Business Day

September 17, 2026

Historians and political scientists like to remind us that 18th century bread riots presaged the French Revolution, rising food costs contributed to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and increases in bread prices helped spark the 2011 Arab Spring. While warnings about oil supply risks and price rises have captured the attention of political leaders, the Middle East war also matters because the region is an important producers of urea, ammonia and sulphur, which are essential inputs for commercial agriculture.

After the initial disruption of the Gulf of Hormuz, it was anticipated that fertilizer production costs would rise and exports from Gulf producers would be delayed or diverted. This led to fears of a global food crisis. While gulf exports have indeed fallen dramatically, however, alternative suppliers such as Egypt, Nigeria, Russia, China and the United States have filled the gap so that warehouses have not run empty. But fertiliser prices have been rising to unsustainable levels for many poorer countries.

Governments maintain strategic petroleum reserves that act as a buffer against immediate oil price impacts, although of course these are now running low across the globe. There is no comparable international reserve system for fertiliser. That means fertiliser markets adjust pretty directly, mostly through price, and the burden falls disproportionately on poorer importing countries.

In the short term, some farmers reduce fertilizer application, affecting future crop yields. While not immediately visible, lower yields and higher costs from the last planting season eventually start to reduce food supply. Over longer periods, nutrient deficient soil becomes permanently less productive. As prices for staple grains and vegetables begin to rise for consumers, they act as a regressive tax, hitting poorer households especially hard.

While rising food prices do not have political effects on their own, they can be the spark that ignites broader pre-existing grievances around inequality, corruption, and political repression, and the focal point for wider anger at governments.

South Africa’s exposure is not only direct (through fertiliser and fuel imports), but indirect through the fragility of neighbouring states. As a region, southern Africa is a net importer of both food and fertilizer.

Countries such as Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia were especially dependent on Gulf suppliers before the Hormuz disruption and they have significant smallholder farming. When fertiliser prices rise sharply, many farmers simply reduce application rates rather than paying the higher price. The result is lower maize yields the following season. That matters because South Africa is the region’s principal surplus maize producer. Poor harvests elsewhere increase demand for SA grain, raising domestic food prices and putting pressure on export logistics.

Higher prices will hurt consumers and strain foreign exchange reserves across the region. The urban poor will be especially hard hit by rising food costs, increasing the risks of social unrest in big cities. Opposition movements are likely to place blame on incumbents and tap into discontent.

While it would be an overstatement to say that higher fertiliser prices directly cause migration, moreover, but they can contribute to it. Where livelihoods depend heavily on agriculture, prolonged economic distress can encourage movement towards cities and sometimes across borders. South Africa has historically been the main destination for regional labour migration, so economic shocks elsewhere often have domestic political consequences here.

This provides a useful reminder that SA’s security is increasingly tied to the institutional resilience of southern Africa. Investments in logistics, agricultural trade corridors and regional food security may yield larger political dividends than they first appear, because they reduce the likelihood that external geopolitical shocks become domestic governance crises. The maintenance of strong political relationships with regional partners, moreover, has become more important than ever.

Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town

The persistent myth of baseload

ANTHONY BUTLER | Baseload power myth lingers as energy system shifts

Coal-era thinking persists despite growing need for storage, flexible grids and modern electricity planning

First published in Business Day

August 07 2026

The idea of baseload energy seems destined to live on in SA even as the age of baseload power draws to a close.

“Baseload” originally referred to the electricity needed as a floor even at the period of lowest demand. It was then used loosely to describe the supply that meets that floor: traditionally, big plants that run continuously at constant output because they’re cheap to run once built and expensive to ramp up or down. In SA, this meant coal, with a little bit of nuclear.

Baseload is fast becoming an outdated idea in the renewables-heavy grids that are proliferating around the world, where the focus has shifted to the challenge of “intermittency”: simply put, what to do when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow.

This is less of a problem than it might seem. After all, wind tends to blow more at night and in winter, whereas solar peaks at midday and in summer. Adding hydroelectric, geothermal and biomass renewables further smooths supply, as do transmission lines that let power flow from where it’s windy or sunny to where it isn’t.

Smart charging of electric vehicles, industrial processes that run when power is abundant, smart thermostats, and time-of-use pricing are becoming widely used.

Meanwhile batteries for short-duration energy storage, and hydro storage thatpumps water uphill when power is abundant and releases it through turbines when it’s needed, are becoming massively cheaper, and long-duration storage options, including compressed air and thermal storage, are under advanced development.

The emerging logic is that renewable supply is somewhat variable, so what matters is having demand response options and storage. There is the added advantage that renewables, once built, don’t carry fuel-supply geopolitical risks (though they do have concentrated supply chain dependencies for rare earth minerals, batteries, and panels).

This probably leaves a residual need forsome “dispatchable” power, in the form of gas peaker plants, new generation nuclear generators, or hydro plants with reservoirs, whose output can be turned up or down in response to grid operators’ needs, as a backup for low probability extended renewable lulls.

“Baseload” lives on in SA’s energy debate in part because coal still accounts for 80% of the country’s power needs. Eskom relies on 15 coal-fired power stations, so coal-as-baseload is still the actual operating model of the grid today, and not yet a historical relic.

Eskom, however, has dramatically highlighted the impending challenge the country faces as a result of ongoing coal fleet retirement. The parastatal is scheduled to retire 8.4 GW of coal-fired capacity over the next three or four years, and this will create a first significant “baseload cliff” in the national system by 2030, one that demands non-coal alternatives or risks new supply shortages.

Ministers meanwhile continue to use the language of “baseload power” – which they treat as synonymous with reliability and affordability – to cover their failures over investment in storage, the transmission grid, and end-user distribution.

There is open conflict over scarce transmission capacity between renewable developers. Until grid capacity scales up substantially and becomes better aligned with optimal renewable generation locations, a flexible dispatchable system cannot be built.

Meanwhile, decaying local distribution infrastructure and municipal financial mismanagement are bringing a new crisis of unreliable electricity access quite unrelated to the generation mix. Ministers continue to imply that the origins of these failures lie in environmentalists’ championing of coal plant decommissioning.

The unique configuration of the pro-coal baseload lobby in SA – combining as it does major party funding donors, ANC-aligned trade unions, and a politically connected and bloated parastatal staff complement – means the baseload idea is set to exercise disproportionate influence, despite the impending disappearance of the baseload model itself.

Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town