ANTHONY BUTLER: The space where Gwede Mantashe and Aaron Motsoaledi meet

While they weather the slings and arrows, Ramaphosa lives to fight another day

 First published in Business Day and BusinessLive

31 January 2025

On the face of it, health minister Aaron Motsoaledi and mineral & petroleum resources minister Gwede Mantashe have little in common. Motsoaledi was a medical doctor who served in Jacob Zuma’s cabinet as health minister. Mantashe is a former trade unionist and communist party leader, who spent the Zuma years running the ANC as secretary-general. 

Motsoaledi oversaw a fourfold expansion of the country’s antiretroviral programme. He declared war on unsaturated fats and lectured his cabinet colleagues on the importance of healthy eating. Mantashe defended Zuma from allegations of corruption and defied the health minister by ingesting fatty acids and concealing them about his person. 

However, in 2018 it emerged that the two men had a shared project. Motsoaledi was part of the “CR17” campaign team for the Nasrec conference, while Mantashe was the key Luthuli House insider behind Cyril Ramaphosa’s rise to the presidency. Ramaphosa has since deployed the loyalists to his cabinets.

Mantashe was appointed mineral resources & energy minister in 2019, in the middle of an insurmountable electricity crisis. The route out of the crisis was not blocked by technical obstacles. International concessional finance was available to accelerate coal plant retirement and the wholesale market road map was two decades old. The problems were political: ideological opposition to “privatisation”; coal lobbies dominated by ANC donors; trade unions opposed to renewables; and “just transition” issues in Mpumalanga. 

Mantashe became the “fossil fuel dinosaur”, stubborn and immovable, with the low centre of gravity of a brontosaurus. He argued that abundant coal resources could drive growth and that Western envoys could not be trusted. He refused to attend the COP26 climate conference in Glasgow, arguing that “many people will be frightened” — he meant of him, rather than of visiting Glasgow. 

Mantashe’s theatrics look understandable in retrospect, given developed countries’ failure to honour their commitments and the slowdown in their own fossil fuel decommissioning. He also bought time for investment to adapt the grid for renewables, an important matter that early evangelists had overlooked. 

Mantashe kept coal interests and unions on his side, and maintained a theatrical opposition to increases in the licensing threshold until exhaustion and despair with power blackouts reached their peak. Once Ramaphosa lifted the threshold (to great personal acclaim), 4,000MW was added in two years. Wealthy households also bought or rented solar systems at their own expense to further ease the generation gap. 

Motsoaledi may well be doing the same job for Ramaphosa in the health sector. The new international consensus about healthcare, signalled in the pro-market Economist magazine in April 2018, is that “universal healthcare, worldwide, is within reach [and] the case for it is a powerful one — including in poor countries”. The trouble is designing sensible reforms and getting them past opposition from vested interests: ideologues, health sector unions, hospital groups, insurance companies and health professionals.

The status quo — unsustainable, inhumane and deeply inefficient — is in nobody’s long-term interests. Long-delayed system reform is needed. But the National Health Insurance (NHI) Act that Ramaphosa signed into law last year has few sincere champions. The ANC’s coalition partners mostly reject it. Four high court challenges from key actors in the sector look watertight, a fact confirmed by the Treasury and other legal advisers long ago. 

The idea of universal healthcare is broad and ambiguous, and basic building blocks such as mandatory health insurance remain contested. Moreover, Ramaphosa cannot let NHI become a proxy issue in ANC factional battles. Nonetheless, once the time is right (which had better be soon), he may find a compromise that does not look like a retreat.

Motsoaledi, like Mantashe, will absorb the pain. Ramaphosa and the government of national unity may then live on to fight another day. 

Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town.

 Opinion / Columnist

ANTHONY BUTLER: Recognition at last for Peter de Villiers

Former Bok coach appears to be in good company at MK party

 First published in BusinessLive

17 January 2025

There are some weeks when it is difficult to know which is more exciting: the fact that people are joining Jacob Zuma’s MK party or the fact that other people aren’t.

This week’s notable MK joiner is former Springbok coach Peter de Villiers, a rugby man turned GOOD Party politician who was elected to the Western Cape provincial legislature in May 2023. He didn’t survive long, being expelled from GOOD in March 2024 after disciplinary proceedings related to a sexual misconduct complaint.

Given the seriousness of the matter — it stood in stark contrast to GOOD’s previous expulsion of senior members for quite understandably hosting alcohol-fuelled sex parties when they were meant to be campaigning — it was little surprise to find De Villiers knocking on the door of Zuma’s “allegations of misconduct” party. 

Allegations levelled at MK defectors have included “improper interference” in the judiciary (party deputy president John Hlophe); embroilment in “the grand heist of savings of vulnerable depositors” at VBS Mutual Bank (the Siviwe Gwarube of the DA’s reference to Floyd Shivambu); “incompetence and misconduct” (parliament on former public protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane); and being an appalling lawyer (pretty much everyone on advocate Dali Mpofu). 

When asked what capabilities he would bring to the party, De Villiers said he would use his “coaching skills” to the benefit of MK, a prospect that may or may not excite campaign managers. He emphasised his central mission would be to “restore dignity to the people of the Western Cape”. People don’t want money, he memorably remarked, they don’t want jobs, they want “recognition”.

The pattern of defections suggests MK intends to build a national footprint in advance of the local government elections, a Herculean task given the distribution of party support in last year’s elections.

‘Tribalism’

Social scientists and other experts confirm that “tribalism” is a major problem in SA society. There is a certain group known for its primitive cultural practices, such as dancing in a strange way. These “unthinking masses” always vote as a collective for the same political party, the DA. But the curse of tribalism isn’t limited to whites.

While the good people of KwaZulu-Natal at least allocated their votes to a range of parties in 2024 — the ANC and IFP secured 17% and 18% respectively and MK 45% — few non-Zulu speakers anywhere in the country voted for Zuma’s party. If MK is to survive, it needs a more diverse pool of voters. 

This brings us to the politician who has not joined MK this week, EFF ordinary member Mbuyiseni Ndlozi. When the EFF was addressing its own problems of ethnic, regional and gender imbalance in recent elections, Ndlozi was its most prominent campaigner in KwaZulu-Natal and the Cape provinces. He may well be more popular among activists than increasingly humourless and megalomaniacal party leader Julius Malema, who is surely right to see him as a “sleeper” and a potential threat. 

MK’s future is also blocked by a great leader who polarises opinion along regional and ethnic lines. The party is nonetheless reaching its tentacles into other communities and parties in anticipation of a major reconfiguration of the party system on Zuma’s departure. Its strategists evidently grasp the importance of coalition building and the unification of “progressive” political parties.

There are many tensions between the potential component parts of a post-Zuma progressive alliance, around issues such as African unity, the role of traditional leaders in society and the politics of gender and sexuality. But De Villiers somehow captured the philosophical essence of the progressive party that may rise out of Zuma’s ashes. There shall be mountains of cash for the leaders and cushy jobs for the activists. As for the ordinary people, henceforth they will be recognised. 

• Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town. 

ANTHONY BUTLER: GNU in spotlight as ANC leadership battle heats up

First published in Business Day

13 December 2024

by Anthony Butler

ANC secretary-general Fikile Mbalula joins a protest march in Pretoria, November 29 2024. Picture: FREDDY MAVUNDA/BUSINESS DAY

Observers of the ANC are reaching for a familiar second term playbook to predict party dynamics. According to tradition, initially fluid factions will consolidate around potential successors and proxy issues at the ANC’s national general council scheduled for mid-June 2025.

The ANC’s electoral system produces two credible presidential candidates while facilitating the creation of two broad national factions, though last-minute turbulence can force factions to cohabit. 

Candidates are not supposed to campaign openly for office so competition between factions at the national general council will be expressed through proxy issues. The main divide will be whether to continue the coalition with the DA, or transform the government of national unity (GNU) into a broad front that includes Jacob Zuma’s MK party and the EFF.

A two-horse race between two weak but evenly matched candidates — deputy president Paul Mashatile and party secretary-general Fikile Mbalula — has been widely expected. Mashatile, damaged by exposes of his finances, lifestyle and unsavoury friends, has burnt bridges by double-crossing KwaZulu-Natal delegates. Mbalula is better placed to capitalise on Eastern Cape “it’s our turn” sentiment, and has the added advantage of having risen to prominence through the ANC Youth League rather than a single province.

Despite the early signs though, the conventional pattern of two-candidate competition and accelerating factional consolidation may not continue into the national general council next year. First, many ANC regions are in turmoil as they undertake their own elective conferences. Parasitic on state resources in the places they govern, they cannot be disciplined but also cannot reliably make deals. The corralling of delegates into organised factions will be harder than ever, so inherently opaque vote buying is likely to grow in importance.  

Second, the key electoral provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng are in chaos, made worse by the proxy battle between Mbalula, who wants to disband provincial structures, and Mashatile, who loves cadres and wants them to enlist in therapy programmes.

Gauteng chair Panyaza Lesufi is now showing the middle finger to the national ANC, but he is not happy simply to ride on Mashatile’s coat-tails. He will be 70 before his senior has served out two presidential terms, so will stab him in the back now if the opportunity arises. 

The rise and prospects of MK remain poorly understood. Will Zuma’s party sweep the board in local elections in KwaZulu-Natal, as Mathews Phosa told the Cape Town Press Club last week? Or is its weak performance in by-elections over the past six months a harbinger of collapse? 

Third, much of the ANC remains in denial over the devastating electoral routing at the end of May. Former president Kgalema Motlanthe long ago anticipated that defeat “would be good for the ANC itself … because those elements who are in it for the largesse will quit it, will desert it, and only then would the possibility arise for salvaging whatever is left of it”. Instead, the GNU has allowed the fantasy of ANC hegemony to persist. 

The most unpalatable part of this new situation, after a decade of concern about EFF influence in ANC leadership elections, is that the DA now holds many of the cards. If leader John Steenhuisen and his party bosses refuse to countenance a coalition with a leader they view as fundamentally corrupt, the elevation of Mashatile would be a fateful decision indeed. 

The ANC expresses itself with much emotion, but it is now driven by money. Denial and political uncertainty make early support for any particular leader or faction highly risky. The 2026 local government elections may have to pass before activists are willing to make a real commitment about their preferred future leadership. 

• Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town.

ANTHONY BUTLER: Constitutionalists up against populists on way to 2050

First published in Business Day

01 November 2024

by Anthony Butler

MK Party supporters. Picture: SANDILE NDLOVU

It is becoming possible, at least after an alcoholic beverage or two, to discern two broad pathways for SA towards 2050. 

Socioeconomic and political conditions will continue to generate widespread discontent with governing parties. Stagnant per capita incomes, decaying infrastructure and the normalisation of corruption are all well established and cannot be significantly reversed for many years. 

In the first scenario, a broadly constitutionalist and economically orthodox coalition will continue to govern, albeit with great fluidity in its composition in the run-up to elections. Such a pact will embrace centrist elements from what is now the ANC and representatives of the urban middle class and others represented by the DA. 

By contrast, in the second scenario a more populist coalition will capitalise on discontent to secure a fleeting national majority. This quite different pact will bring about a reconfiguration of the constitutional order and engage in hazardous economic experimentation. 

While the focus of much analysis has been the fragility of the government of national unity (GNU), we also need to consider the viability of a coalition-building project among groupings outside the frontiers of the unity government, the MK party and the EFF.

Scholars are at loggerheads about the EFF’s policy proposals — is it fascist, proto-fascist, predatory, populist, right wing or left wing? MK has fully grasped the centrality of coalition building, repeatedly urging “the unity and unification of all progressive political parties” to fight against “white minority rule in SA”. The EFF repeats a similar mantra about the people at large battling “white monopoly capital”. 

However, there are several reasons why such coalition-building will prove difficult. Opposition parties need to campaign with strong messages to motivate the six out of 10 eligible voters who do not vote. Scholars are at loggerheads about the EFF’s policy proposals — is it fascist, proto-fascist, predatory, populist, right wing or left wing?

Some anthropologists even describe the EFF as amorphous regarding class and identity, or an “intense, confusing amalgam”. The study of MK has set off on a similar path, and scholars may well find another amorphous amalgam. 

Yet there are clear messages that cannot easily coexist within a coalition of “progressive forces”. MK seethes with resentment at immigrants, demanding trained locals replace imported skills, stronger border security and “respect for SA African laws”. The EFF is still all hug-a-foreigner. 

The red-tops question Western conceptions of democracy, which they believe should be “aligned with” versions ostensibly practised by traditional leaders. MK goes much further, demanding greater authority for tribal monarchs and chiefs, deference to their arbitrary power at national level, and the establishment of constitutional patriarchy. 

MK is socially conservative in a way the EFF simply cannot be, as is exemplified by its open determination to repeal same-sex marriage legislation and its slightly less open bigotry. 

The two parties share another important feature that divides them: ethnic and regional heartlands. Indeed, the MK party’s vote share in the 2024 elections, concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal, set back the EFF’s efforts to build out of its traditional strongholds. 

Where regional or ethnic divisions affect voting, they complicate coalition formation. A big party leader must recruit allies to solicit votes, resulting in coalitions between ethnic and regional blocs. These deals are brokered by leaders who buttress their base by distributing resources to activists and voters. This results in parties dominated by charismatic leaders who ostentatiously distribute the spoils of office to their followers. 

Of course, MK and the EFF don’t have many spoils to distribute. Their leaders dominate their parties and seem unlikely — or unable — to concede control over their constituencies to one another. One of them also has a limited life expectancy. All of this means coalition building may prove beyond the capabilities of the leaders of the progressive forces. 

• Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town.

ANTHONY BUTLER: Ramaphosa seems to be enjoying the GNU ride

First published in Business Day

20 September 2024

by Anthony Butler

President Cyril Ramaphosa. File photo: ALET PRETORIUS/REUTERS

President Cyril Ramaphosa gives the impression that he is enjoying presidential office for the first time. On the face of it, this is surprising. After all, the ANC has suffered a decline of electoral fortunes under his leadership. 

There are perhaps three reasons for Ramaphosa’s seeming contentment. Even his many critics accept that he has played a political blinder since the elections. His post-election speech at the Electoral Commission results centre in Midrand at the start of June proclaimed that “our people expect all parties to work together within the framework of our constitution and address whatever challenges we encounter peacefully and in accordance with the prescripts of our constitution and the rule of law”. 

The government of national unity (GNU) conceit unveiled soon afterwards was well understood by senior ANC and IFP politicians who were involved in Nelson Mandela’s GNU. One DA leader had even written an extended analysis of the benefits of this first iteration. While these parties had prepared carefully for GNU, the EFF and MK party evidently had not. 

EFF leader Julius Malema’s sartorial conversion in 2024, swapping red T-shirts for tailored business suits, suggests he misread tentative offers of high office emanating from ANC brokers. That he insisted on the removal of Ramaphosa as a precondition for participation in a coalition deal indicates he was disastrously misled. The MK party’s anti-constitutionalist programme likewise ruled it out of the GNU on the terms that Ramaphosa so carefully elaborated. 

The president made the GNU palatable to a wider constituency in the ANC in an underhand but also ingenious manner by ignoring the terms of the statement of intent that supposedly governed it. He shamelessly applied non-functional but decorative fig leaves such as Gayton Mackenzie, Patricia de Lille and Bantu Holomisa to cover the embarrassing extremities of the grand coalition. 

The second factor behind Ramaphosa’s good cheer may be the simplification of ANC internal management the election has brought. MK and the EFF have attracted politicians with legal difficulties, and spokespeople with complex psychological challenges, each of whom would otherwise be making Ramaphosa’s life difficult inside the ANC. It is arguably better to have Mzwanele Manyi or Carl Niehaus inside the tent pissing out than outside pissing in, but it is surely better still to have them on a different campsite altogether. 

A third reason for the president’s newly placid demeanour may be a fresh chance to shape policy somewhat freed from vested interests in the ANC’s tripartite alliance. On economic policy, the SACP now looks even more ridiculous than is customary because its general secretary has been berating a GNU in which its own leaders are participating at ministerial level. 

The Basic Education Laws Amendment Bill that was recently signed into law may be pitifully inadequate — it ignores performance measurement and union-linked corruption — but it has one consequential element: muddying school governing body control over language policy.

Any fair-minded observer knows there are schools that use language as an instrument of racial exclusion. But we have also seen racial populists such as Gauteng premier Panyaza Lesufi building political capital by exploiting the predicament of black parents. 

Regarding National Health Insurance, in which current symbolic policy reflects the interests of ANC ministers, unions and profiteers, the opposition has prioritised the demands of insurance and hospital companies and a narrow band of private health beneficiaries.

It is not impossible at all that the GNU will bring in pragmatic compromises that improve overall outcomes in both cases, and perhaps — if the coalition survives — in many others besides.

• Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town.

ANTHONY BUTLER: Weighing the DA’s slice of the unity government

Some party members are unhappy with GNU balance of power, but a closer breakdown is warranted

First published in Business Day

26 JULY 2024

ANTHONY BUTLER

We all know ANC activists who have noisily condemned the government of national unity (GNU). But DA supporters have more quietly, but equally vehemently, expressed discontent with the grand coalition.

Such scepticism is nothing new. A July 2022 Social Research Foundation poll suggested that two-thirds of ANC voters would “compromise party values … for the sake of creating a stable coalition”. Only four out of 10 DA voters were happy to do so.

Making matters worse is a perception that the ANC has benefited most from the deal. The key evidence presented by DA critics is a lack of proportionality in the allocation of meaningful ministerial positions.

American social scientist William Gamson first suggested in 1961 that parties making coalition deals expect the “payoff” from the deal to be proportional to the “resources” they bring to it. A decade later, European political scientists recast this insight as “Gamson’s Law”: the key resource parties possess — the proportion of seats they hold in the legislature — will closely match the share of ministerial portfolios they secure.

There have not been many laws in political science, and the few that have emerged have eventually turned out to be wrong. It was therefore a happy surprise for proponents of Gamson’s Law that numerous empirical studies of coalition formation, in the years that followed, confirmed that parties reliably secured ministerial positions in proportion to the legislative seats they held.

The absence of this relationship in SA has been a key basis for DA member discontent. The parties in the GNU together hold 287 seats out of the total 400 in the national assembly. The new government includes 34 cabinet ministers and 38 deputy ministers.

The ANC secured 159 seats in the National Assembly, and this translated to 22 cabinet positions and 31 deputy ministerial positions. In percentage terms, 55% of GNU seats led to 65% of cabinet positions and 82% of deputy ministerial positions.

The DA secured 87 seats in parliament but was allocated only six cabinet posts and five deputy ministerial positions. A total of 30% of GNU seats brought just 18% of cabinet portfolios and 13% of deputy ministerial positions. Adding insult to injury, many DA activists believe the party has been deprived of the most powerful and prestigious portfolios, notably in foreign affairs and the economy cluster.

However, there are four considerations DA activists should bear in mind before they condemn their negotiating team. The first is that Gamson’s Law derives from the experiences of parliamentary systems in Western Europe. A landmark study published earlier in 2024 in European Political Science Review demonstrated that it “does not travel especially well” across constitutional types or parts of the world.

Second, the biggest cause of disproportion is deputy ministerial portfolios that are mostly packed with ANC hacks, but these ministers have strictly limited powers. And third, “payoff” must be understood negatively as well as positively. The DA has steered clear of “no-win” departments and “ministerial graveyards”. It has also minimised its exposure to potential coalition collapse by deploying mostly inconsequential leaders to the executive. Four of the six DA cabinet ministers — Siviwe Gwarube, Solly Malatsi, Leon Schreiber and Dean Macpherson — are political toddlers in their 30s.

Finally, payoff isn’t just about bums on seats round the cabinet table. Long-standing demands from the DA and the IFP for devolution of powers to provinces and metropolitan authorities are likely to materialise across several sectors. The broad principle of “sufficient consensus” set out in the GNU’s founding statement of intent meanwhile places an effective policy veto in DA hands.

Sceptical activists doubtless need persuading about the merits of the coalition deal. However, the payoffs from the GNU are not so unbalanced so as to bring any early DA rebellion against it.

• Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town.

ANTHONY BUTLER: Brinkmanship over cabinet posts shows GNU is not yet government

Pact provides shared framework for parties to interact constructively and for citizens to adapt to unfamiliar terrain

First published in Business Day

28 JUNE 2024

In the face of last-minute brinkmanship over cabinet posts we have been reminded once again that the government of national unity (GNU) is not yet a government at all.

A GNU is rather a useful idea, one that exists only because a particular group of people have decided it does. It provides a shared framework for parties to interact constructively with each other and for citizens to adapt to an unfamiliar political terrain.

The GNU’s foundational “statement of intent” included an agreement that its composition “shall be discussed and agreed among the existing parties, whenever new parties desire to be part of the GNU”. This basic commitment was not respected, which provided an early reminder that the statement is not binding. It is clear that a GNU can quickly disappear in a puff of smoke.

The idea of a GNU has been most attractive to the bigger parties involved. The ANC doesn’t have to admit it lost; instead it has been “sent a message” to work with others. The DA can participate in national government despite a stagnant support base. And the IFP can govern a province without actually having to win it.

On matters of process, the GNU commits to the magical logic of “sufficient consensus”, which arises when “parties to the GNU representing 60% of seats in the National Assembly agree”. This means the ANC and DA both have an effective veto — a huge ANC concession — so long, of course, as the statement of intent is respected, and the parties can agree precisely which kinds of decisions require cross-party consensus.

If the sharing out of ministerial portfolios gets back on track, the far harder part — reaching detailed agreement on policy — still lies ahead. Once a cabinet is sworn in there will be a policy lekgotla, followed by “an all-inclusive national dialogue” in which parties, civil society, labour and business will supposedly forge “a national social compact”. Such road-signs point towards the all-too-familiar national policy quagmire.

Moreover, the smaller parties remain a problem, adding needless complexity and mostly being distinguished by the personalities of their leaders rather than by any potential contribution they might make. Complexity can undermine coalition stability, but these parties also provide the essential “national unity” fig leaf any viable coalition now needs.

The good news is that the resource-seeking and grievance-based parties are on the outside. There has been an early commitment to defend constitutionalism, the current governance framework and institutional innovations such as Operation Vulindlela. Real policy overlap exists between the broad reform factions of the ANC, DA and IFP.

If the DA temporarily withdraws from the GNU negotiations, the basic arithmetic will not change. The ANC will be back where it began: with an unpalatable — hopefully impossible — choice between the EFF and MK. President Cyril Ramaphosa will probably be forced to form a minority government, and economic turbulence and party donor pressures will redouble.

Meanwhile, the tortuous negotiations have helped many voters to work through their confusion and pain. While there is little evidence to support the famous theory that there are five stages of grief, there has been a lot of denial and anger, and accusations and betrayal, on display.

Parties desperate to avoid alienation of their supporters, and possible desertion of their activists, have been bought time by the GNU. Weeks of negotiation have allowed party foot soldiers and shocked citizens to progress far towards acceptance that we live in a new political world.

Some of them, sadly, may need longer. But amid a national crisis the country cannot afford a prolonged stalemate.

• Butler teaches public policy at the University of Cape Town.